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ABSTRACT
When several investors with different risk aversions tradecompetitively
in a capital market, the allocation of wealth fluctuatesrandomly between them
and acts as a state variable against which each marketparticipant will want
to hedge. This hedging motive complicates the investors'portfolio choice and
the equilibrium in the capital market. Althoughevery financial economist is
aware of this difficulty, to our knowledge, this issue has never beenanalyzed
in detail. The current paper features two investors, with thesame degree of
impatience, one of them being logarithmic and the other having an isoelastic
utility function. They face one risky Constant-return-to-scale stationary
production opportunity and they can borrow and lend to and from each other.
The behavior of the allocation of' wealth is characterized,along with the
behavior of the rate of interest and that of the security market line. The
two main results are: (1) investors in equilibrium do revise theirportfolios
over time so that some trading takes place, (2) provided some conditionsare
satisfied, the allocation of wealth admits a steady-state distribution atan
interior point; this is in contrast to the certaintycase, where one investor
in the long run holds all the wealth. The existence oftrading opens the way





Philadelphia, PA 19104-63671. Introduction
The question of dynamic asset pricing has been addressed so far,only
under the assumption that all investors are alike (Lucas (1978),Cox,
Ingersoll and Ross (1985)). The asset prices so obtained are then purely
virtual prices, since no trading takes place in the capital market. The
finance profession, that is, has no theory to offer to account fortrading
volume and capital flows between capital market participants, under conditions
of rational symmetric information. The present paper aims to fill thisgap.
Since our aim is to generate trading in the capital market, we must avoid
circumstances which are known to induce constancy of the investors'ownership
shares in the various assets, even though investors are not identical to each
other. The work of Rubinstein (19714) has outlined these circumstances: jf
investors all have Hyperbolic-Absolute_Risk_Aversion (HARA) utility functions,
with the same impatience parameter and the same cautiousness parameter (but
are otherwise different from each other), they forever hold a fixed share of
the market portfolio, and a fixed amount of a consol bond offering riskless
payments. Such portfolio policies obviously require no trading: investors
Just live off the income generated by their constant portfolio.
There are several ways in which we can choose to deviate from the
Rubinstein base case. Investors may differ in their impatience parameter.
The question has been examined by Becker (1980) under conditions of certainty;
the result is that the least impatient investor will hold all the wealth in
the long run. It seems unlikely that new insights would be gained by the
introduction of risk into Becker's analysis. We therefore retain the
Rubinstein assumption of equal rates of impatience across investors.
Instead, we examine investors whose utility function is isoelastic with
differing levels of relative risk aversion. Isoelastic utility functionsbelong to the HARA class of utility functions, and in their case, the
cautiousness parameter of Rubinstein is simply equal to the relative risk
aversion. In this way, the investors considered here differ in their
cautiousness parameter, and we can expect that a constant portfolio policy
will not be optimal for them.
The balance of this paper will show that this conjecture is correct.
Along with some trading volume, our paper will produce a variable distribution
of wealth across investors, but one which does not necessarily converge to
100% ownership by one of them; and it will also produce a variable rate of
interest. The stochastic process for the short—term rate of interest will be
shown to have several stable points.
The model is described in section 2. The equilibrium of the capital
market is characterized in section 3. Section 1 provides a derivation of the
dynamics of the distribution of wealth between investors. Section 5
quantifies the amount of trading in the market and derives asset prices, with
special emphasis on bond prices and the term structure of interest rates.
2. The model
The capital market of our model economy is populated with but two
investors, with the same rate of impatience ,butdifferent risk aversions.
The analysis is greatly simplified and does not lose its illustrative power if
we restrict one investor to have a logarithmic utility function, while the
other one exhibits any degree of' risk aversion l-y where yisthe power of his
isoelastic utility function:1
Note that the horizon is infinite.
—2-C —pt 1 r (1) MaxEj e—cdt; y<1,
0
and c is his finite rate of consumption of a single good.
Recall (Merton (1971)) that the logarithmic case can be obtained as the
limit of the above case for y +0;we shall therefore simply write the
optimizing equations for the investor with the power utility function.
The two investors consume a single good and have access to two investment
opportunities:
-theycan buy shares in one constantreturn-to-scale production
activity, whose random output per unit of capital has a constant
gaussian distribution with fixed parametersand a;
-theycan borrow and lend to and from each other at the equilibrium
riskless2 rate r, which varies over time inan endogenous fashion.
Other notations are as follows:
W:wealth of the non-logarithmic investor;
W*:wealth of the logarithmic investor;
x, x*:share of each investor's wealth invested in the risky
production opportunity;
c, c*: consumption rates of'thetwo investors;
(2) wW/(W +W*): the non—logarithmic investor's share of total wealth.
The dynamics of an investor's wealth for a given investment decision x
and a given consumption decision c are well known:
(3) dW {W[r +x(a—r)J-c}dt+Wxadz
where dz is the random white noise affecting production. In this equation,
the rate of interest r is the market rate. It is not constant over time. In
2Endogenous default is left for future research.fact, we can reasonably postulate that it is a function of the distribution of
wealth w:rr(w). The formulation of the two investors' optimization
problem must, therefore, incorporate the behavior of the distribution of
wealth.
Applying Ito's lemma to the definition (2) ofand using the equation
for the dynamics of wealth (3), as well as the analogous equation for the log
investor, we obtain:
(14) d w(1 -w)[(X-x*)(cL—r)-+
- (x-x*)(Jx+(1-w)x)a2]dt+(x-x*)adz}
Not surprisingly, the allocation of wealth would be constant if the two
investors were to hold the same portfolio (xx*) and the allocation of
wealth also admits two absorbing barriers at w =0and w =1:if one investor
comes to hold all the wealth, he thereafter holds all the wealth forever.
The maximization of (1) subject to (3) and (14) with respect to c and x
(but taking the behavior of w as given in a pure competitive fashion) is a
standard dynamic program. The partial differential equation for its
(undiscounted) value function J(W, w) is a Hamilton-Jacobi equation which can
be written easily. One can proceed in two steps, optimizing consumption
first, and then the portfolio. The optimality condition with respect to
consumption is:
(5) c'1
Substituting the optimal consumption decision into the original Hamilton—
Jacobi equation, one can verify that a function of the form:
(6) J(W, w)1W1I(w)
Yis a solution, i.e., that the W variable does cancel out.3 This being done,
one is left with the second problem of optimization, with respect to the
portfolio x:
(7) 0 —+ (1—
1 22 I' +Maxy{r +x(a—r)+ — 1)xa +— xaw}
12 + (ii + Cu
whereand w are the drift and the diffusion coefficients of cu, which
appeared in equation (l.) above.
The optimality condition with respect to x is evidently:
() — r+(y — 1)xa+ ow0




The optimal portfolio is of the well-known form applying to an isoelastic
investor, except for the last term of the numerator which represents hedging
against shifts in the distribution of wealth, which induce shifts in the rate
of interest.
3.Equilibrium
Instantaneously, the equilibrium in the capital market is characterized
by:
as a result: c/W =
-5—a) the non-logarithmic investor's portfolio optimality condition (8),
which reads as follows, when the form of' the diffusion coefficient
is made explicit:
(10) a -r (1 -y)o2x-(
w(1 -w)a2(x-x*)
b) the logarithmic investor's portfolio condition: it is well known
since E-Iakansson (1971) that such an investor exhibits no hedging
motive, i.e., that his function 1* is a constant; hence:
n
(11) a—r a x
c) a 'supply equals demand' condition:
(12) wx +(1—w)x* 1
Solving these three equations simultaneously, one obtains all the












(16) x I' 1 — —w(l—w)
isbest interpreted as the non—logarithmic investor's risk tolerance "adjusted
for the hedging motive," since, in effect, his decision is mean—variance
optimizing, in the static sense, but at a level of risk aversion different
—6—from 1 —y.Similarly, by analogy with the CAPM, wA +1-wcan be seen as
the market's risk tolerance, also "adjusted for thehedging motive."
The reason why the standard mean-variance frameworksurvives, with a
minor change,4 despite the introduction of one more state variableand the non
stationarity of the rate of interest, is that this additional state variablew
isperfectly correlated with wealth (cf. equations (3)and(14)).
Over time, the equilibrium is further characterizedby the dynamics (14)
of the distribution of wealth (with x, x,r, c/W, c*/W* substituted in) and
by the two functions 1(w) and I*(w). We mentioned above that 1* isa
constant; in fact, solving the logarithmic investor's partial differential
equation for 1* (which is (7) with y0), subject to the transversality
conditions indicated in Merton (1971), produces 1*i/p and therefore c*/W*
p. Once these elements are taken into account, the dynamics ofw, for a given
I function, are:
2 2




and,finally, substituting equations (13) to (15), and (17) above, we obtain




2 x 2 + -
x + 1-- (y-i)a L+ 1-
amatter of fact, if we had introduced a multiplicity of assets,we
could have proved that a Tobiri separation theorem applies to thepresent
situation.
-7—2 2 —i--
I r wa(X —1) y—l




+— 1(l—w) oj I wX+1-w
where A is given by (16).
The problem of the determination of equilibrium is thus reduced to that
of solving the partial differential equation (18) (coupled with (16)), subject
to two "natural" boundary conditions, corresponding to the two absorbing










p — — (1—
Everythingone might want to know about the equilibrium path, will follow from
this 1(w) function: once it is known, equations (13) to (17), and the
equation of footnote #3, give the portfolio choices, the rate of interest, the
market price of risk, the dynamics of the allocation of wealth, and
consumption choices.
14 Dynamics of the allocation of wealth
It is unlikely that equation (18) subject to boundary conditions (19) and
(20) should have a known analytical solution. Considering, however, that the
domain of variation of'wis a closed set, and that the behavior of I on the
boundary is well specified, this partial differential equation lends itself
nicely to numerical analysis.5 We choose to present the results in terms of
5cf. Smith (1978).
-8-the behavior (specifically the drift) of the distribution of wealthover time
(equation (17)), rather than in terms of the I function itself. The reader is
referred to figures la and lb, which are "expected" phase diagrams forc.
These figures allow one to study the stability of the distribution of
wealth. There are always two points which are stochastically stable, in the
sense that both the drift and the volatility of w vanish at those points:
they are, of course, w0 and w1. They correspond to situations in which
the entire wealth is concentrated in the hands of one investor.Depending on
the value of the impatience parameter ,andon that of the risk aversion
parameter 1 -y(see the figures), one of these two endpoints may also be
absolutely stable in the expected value sense, which means that the drift of w
would attract it towards that endpoint, when starting away from it.
Under certainty (0),one of the two endpoints would necessarily be
the long—run outcome: when the two investors have the same rate of impatience
p, the one with the higher risk aversion6 would end up owning all the wealth,
when the rate of impatience p is less than the earning rate,andvice—
versa.7 There would be no stablepoint in-between.
Figures la and lb reveal, however, that the case of uncertainty is
qualitatively different from the case of certainty: within some range of
parameter values the curve giving the drift of w as a function of w, cuts the
w axis with a negative slope--implying stability—- for a value of w different
from 0 or 1. For these parameter values, the distribution of wealth will
forever wander around its stable interior value, tending to return to it after
6Risk aversion would act thenonly as a measure of elasticity of
substitution between periods.
7Wien= , thelong-run allocation of wealth would be determined by the
initial situation.
—9-a shock, unless a series of them causes it to hit one of the two absorbing
barriers at 0 or 1.
As the allocation of wealth fluctuates, the security market line of the
traditional CAPM should be viewed as pivoting around one fixed point
representing the risky production opportunity, while the variable slope of the
line determines the current value of the riskless rate of interest. The
behavior of the allocation of wealth is thus mirrored in the stochastic
behaviors of the market price of risk 1/(Xw +1-w) andof the equilibrium
riskless rate of interest r, which are monotonic functions of wviaequations
(15) and (16) above.8 They both admit two absorbing barriers, at 1 and 1 -y
forthe market price of risk, and at -a2and—(1- forthe rate of
interest. These values correspond to the endpoints w0 and w1,where one
of the two investors would impose his risk aversion and his corresponding
value of the rate of interest.
Whenever there exists a stable interior value of the distribution of
wealth, so is there one for the rate of interest, which wanders between the
two extreme values, while tending to return to the stable interior one. There
are then three possible long-run values of the rate of interest: two which
are absorbing and one which is stable in the expected-value sense (refer to
figures 2a and 2b). The volatility of the rate of interest is by no means
constant: it is zero at the two absorbing barriers and exhibits a maximum
somewhere in-between.
Although this model is perhaps the most simple one can conceive, while
still exhibiting a variable rate of interest, the process so obtained for the
8r is an increasing function when 1 -y > 1,a decreasing one otherwise;
the opposite is true for the market price of risk.
-10—rate is much more complex than had been previously assumed (cf. e.g., the
Ornstein—Uhlenbeck process used by Vasicek (1977)).
5. Trading, asset prices andtheterm structure
Asset holdings by the two investors are given by the values of x and x
(equations (1L) and (13)), for the non—logarithmic and the logarithmic
investor respectively. They represent the share of each investor's wealth
invested in the risky asset. However, the two investors' shares of ownership
in the risky production opportunity are equal to x and x*(1 -w)
respectively.
Trading takes place in the capital market if and only if w0 or 1 and
xw is a non constant function of a fluctuating w; for, this implies that one
investor buys shares from and sells shares to the other, as time passes. In
contrast to previous theories of dynamic capital market equilibrium, the
present model accounts for (some) trading volume. Indeed figures 3a and 3b
display the shares of ownership as functions of the allocation of wealth and
it is clear that they are no constant: when one investor owns almost all the
wealth, almost all of his wealth is allocated to the risky asset and, by
necessity, he owns almost all the shares of this asset. The other investor
mayormay not be a borrower, depending on his risk aversion, but his leverage
always remains finite (x < 1/(1 —y),x< 1 -y) sothat he can only own a
small fraction of the shares of the risky asset. As an investor's share of
wealth fluctuates, so does his share of'ownershipof the risky asset; and, of
course, his share of wealth does fluctuate because, as a result of different
risk aversions, the two investors make up their portfolios differently. Our
model provides scope for capital flows between investors; the current-account
balance between them is not equal to zero.
—11—The current model includes only one risky asset, so that it is not
exactly appropriate to discuss the relative pricing of assets. Assets which
are in zero net supply may nonetheless be priced. These assets would have to





ER expected rate of return from the asset,
s =covarianceof the asset rate of return with the productive
opportunity.
The price of the asset, which is a function of u--and possibly of W +
dependingon its contractual definition—-will generally have to satisfy
equation (21) interpreted as a functional equation.
Since the present formulation has been able to generate an interesting
behavior for the short-term rate of interest, one might think of applying it
to the pricing of bonds. Rather than expressing the price of the bond as a
function of the allocation of wealth which is not observable, it will be
empirically more useful to express it as a function P of the rate of interest
r.9 Knowing the behavior of r, a straightforward application of Ito's lemma
to the unknown function provides expressions for ER and s. Substituting them
into (21) gives:
2
13P P a P 2i 1 aP r__________ (22) —1— — + — + — c
j r —— — I
P at3r r 2 r P 3r r wX +1—w ar
where t is the time to maturity, 1'r and cr are the drift and the volatility of
9and,ofcourse, of the time to maturity.
12—the rate of interest,10 and the expression within brackets on the right—hand
side is commonly known as "the market price of interest-rate risk" (cf.
Vasicek (1977) or Brennan and Schwartz (1982)). This quantity is thus equal
to the market price of risk, as defined above,11 times the volatility of the
output. It follows from what we said and from equation (15) that the
volatility of the market price of risk and the volatility of the rate of
interest are proportional to each other. It would therefore be inconsistent
to assume, as is sometimes done, that the market price of interest—rate risk
is constant, in a setting which allows for interest-rate uncertainty.
The boundary conditions which accompany equation (22) are easy to obtain
since it is known that the rate of interest will remain constant, once it hits
one of the two absorbing barriers. For these values of the rate, the price of
a pure-discount unit bond is simply equal to the present value, computed at a
constant rate, of one unit of consumption paid at maturity. One can then
solve equation (22) numerically, working backwards from a price equal to one
at maturity. The solution may be expressed in terms of the bond's yield to
maturity, instead of its price. Figure )4 displays the term structure of
yields for one combination of parameter values, and for various current values
of the short-term rate of interest. Except when the short rate is at one of
101n the present model the correlation between the rate of interest and
the risky output is equal to -1.
I.e., the average market risk aversion.
-13-the absorbing barriers, the term structure is upward sloping, thus reflecting
a liquidity premiwn.12
6.Conclusion
The current model, to our knowledge, is the first to present a self-
contained account of dynamic capital market equilibrium, involving investors
with different taste parameters. The theory is self contained in the sense
that all state variables are identified and have a well-specified,
endogenously determined, stochastic process. The model exhibits a
stochastically variable distribution of wealth, which sometimes admits a
stable interior value, and a stochastically variable short rate of interest
with the same property. It also produces trading in the capital market.
The agenda for future research includes an extension to the international
setting, with several productive assets, endogenous default and deviations
from purchasing-power parity, and possibly also several currencies.
12Even though the chosen combination of parameter values is one which
produces a stable interior value for the rate of interest (see figure 2a), the
tendency for the rate to return to that value, when the current value is
sufficiently high, fails to generate a hump—shaped term structure. The reason
for this result which is at variance with, e.g., Vasicek's structure of
yields, is that the drift of the rate of interest is of small magnitude next
to its volatility. Hence the risk premium almost alone (plus the
uninteresting technical fact that the equation for the calculation of a yield
is non linear) determines the shape of the term structure.
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